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Abstract
A comprehensive summary offered to clarify the nature of this hybrid and the policy forces
shaping it by tracing the main themes in the development of extradition law and practice in the
United States and placing extradition into context with alternative means of dealing with internatinal crime.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of extradition is related to but distinct from the
concepts of asylum, deportation and exclusion. The right of asylum
refers to the discretionary right of the sovereign to grant refuge to
a foreign fugitive.' Although somewhat regulated by custom, asylum is generally regarded as a purely political, non-legal concept. 2
1. Walker, Asylum, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 49 (A.
DeConde ed. 1978); see generally 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

428-502 (1968).
2.

Walker, supra note 1, at 49.
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Deportation is the unilateral expulsion of an alien by the sovereign, 3 and exclusion the refusal to admit an alien. 4 In contrast, extradition is the surrender by one nation to another of a person
found in the asylum nation's jurisdiction and wanted by the re5
questing nation for the prosecution or punishment of a crime.
These four concepts represent alternatives for dealing with the fugitive or undesirable alien. Extradition, however, may also be applied to the asylum country's nationals. 6 Another distinguishing
characteristic of extradition is that it depends on some form of initial request by a foreign government. 7
International extradition occupies an especially peculiar place
in United States law. By all indications the Founding Fathers gave
the subject virtually no consideration in framing the Constitution; 8
forging a place for it within the constitutional framework of American government proved exceedingly difficult. 9 The result after decades of trial and error is a remarkable hybrid, accommodating elements of state, 10 federal" and foreign law, 12 executive' 3 and judi3.

See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893); BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY 394 (5th ed. 1979).

4. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893); 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976). Exclusion. is
sometimes used broadly so as to encompass deportation. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and
Citizens § 71 (1962).
5. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902); Research in InternationalLaw
under the Auspices of the Faculty of the HarvardLaw School, . Extradition, 29 AM.
J. INT'L L. 15, 21 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research] "Extradition
is the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for prosecution or punishment." Id. While the practice has extremely ancient roots, see notes 15-17 infra
and accompanying text, the etymology of the word "extradition" is from the French,
and first came into the English language in the nineteenth century. I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1971). The first official United States use
dates from 1848. Id.
6. The United States will extradite nationals unless expressly forbidden by
treaty. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); see 1 J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON ExTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL RENDITION §§ 119-147 (1891) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE ON EXTRADITION]. Many nations refuse to extradite nationals as a general
rule, and express provisions exempting nationals from surrender are a common treaty
feature. Id. §§ 119-128; I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 94-131.
7. See, e.g., President of United States ex. rel. Caputo v. Kelly, 92 F.2d 603 (2d
Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 635 (1938).
8. 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, §§ 16-17.
9. See notes 38-53 infra and accompanying text.
10. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922) (sufficiency of the evidence to justify
apprehension and commitment for trial of accused is determined according to the
laws of the asylum state); cf. Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D.
Ga. 1977) (state's substantive law provides initial guidance but unique or extraordi-
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cial functions, 14 and a measure of politics in a delicately orchestrated system.
This comment is a comprehensive summary offered to clarify
the nature of this hybrid and the policy forces shaping it by tracing
the main themes in the development of extradition law and prac-

tice in the United States and placing extradition into context with
alternative means of dealing with international crime.
I.

GENERAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The earliest treaty known to history, the Egyptian-Hittite
peace convention of 1280 B.C., included an extradition agreement
for the surrender of political enemies. 15 Extradition and extradition
treaties in the ancient and medieval world were concerned primar-

ily with the surrender of the king's enemies. 16 Nations felt little
need to cooperate in the suppression of ordinary crime, while political and religious dissidents remained a threat to the sovereign's

power as long as they found sanctuary elsewhere. 17 This focus on
political rather than common criminals dominated extradition practice until the nineteenth century.
The political and economic changes of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries produced a reversal in this policy. The growth
of international commerce, urbanization and wealth led to a concomitant growth of crime,1 8 while the development of liberal political philosophies led to an increasing tolerance of political and religious dissidents. 19 Hence, common criminals eclipsed political
nary provisions of asylum state's laws should not be applied where such app!ication
would impair effectuation of intent of treaty).
11. Extradition is within the treaty making power of the Executive branch of
the federal government. Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1977); In re
Edmondson, 352 F. Supp. 22 (D. Minn. 1972); 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1976).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1976) (Authentication of documents shall be according to
the laws of the demanding nation); see notes 95-102 infra and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414
U.S. 884 (1973); 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
15. I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 12.
16.

Id.

at 5, 166-69; 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, §§ 6-7, 205-207;

Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 108-09.
17. I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 7; Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 108.
18. I. SHEARER, supra, note 5, at 8-9, 11-12; 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra
note 6, § 3; HarvardResearch, supra note 5, at 35-38.
19. See, e.g., Report of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to President
George Washington (Mar. 22, 1792), reprinted.inJ. LATANE, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 86 (1927).
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offenders as the focus of extradition practice, 20 and by the midnineteenth century non-extradition of political offenders had become the widely accepted rule. 2 ' This political offender exception
has remained the principle source of international controversy ever
2
since. 2
Grotius argued that nations had a duty arising under natural
law to surrender another nation's criminals on demand or else to
punish them themselves. 2 3 This view never gained favor in practice, as it conflicted with the ancient right to grant asylum 2 4 and
the rule that one state does not enforce the penal laws of an25
other.
Extradition was fairly rare until the mid-eighteenth century,
when the French embarked on an aggressive treaty signing campaign with their neighbors. 2 6 By the nineteenth century the rule
that an obligation to extradite e~isted ,only under treaty was established.2 7 In other cases, extradition could be granted as a matter of
comity.

28

The Anglo-American view on extradition was more restrictive.
The British refused to participate in this trend led by their ene29
mies and held themselves out as the champions of asylum.
II.
A.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
LAW AND PRACTICE
The Letters of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State

The Constitution nowhere expressly addresses international
20. I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 166-69.
21. Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 107-08.
22. See I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 166-93; Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962).
23. 2 DE JURE BELLIS Ac PAcIS, Book II, ch. 21 (1625).
24. Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 41; Walker, supra note 1, at 49.
25. Oda, The Individual in InternationalLaw, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 519 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968); H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 78-79 (8th ed. 1866). This concept should not be confused with
extraterritorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 259-265A
(2d rev. ed. 1945).
26.

1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, §§ 6-7; A. BILLOT, TRAITI

DE

L'EXTRADITION 37-46 (1874); HarvardResearch, supra note 5, at 41.
27. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933); I. SHEARER, supra note
5, at 24; 2 C. HYDE, supra note 25, § 310.
28. I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 30-31; 2 C. HYDE, supra note 25, § 312.
29. A. BILLOT, supra note 26, at 38; Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 41-43,
43 n.2; see also I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 8-9, 12-15.
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extradition, 30 for at the time the Constitution was framed the practice was virtually nonexistent in Anglo-American law. 3 1
The earliest authority comes from the correspondence of Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson in 1791 and 1792.32 At President
Washington's request, 33 Jefferson examined both the British and
Continental practice. He observed that British law granted the executive no power to extradite as a matter of comity, and he
adopted this principle into American law. 3 4 Jefferson's successors
on several occasions requested extradition from nations whose laws
permitted the practice, but Jefferson's rule forced them to qualify
their requests with the caveat that reciprocity could not be granted
35
without a treaty.
In examining the Continental practice, Jefferson was deeply
concerned about the use of extradition against political dissidents,
but he did not agree with the British answer of granting blanket
asylum. 3 6 He believed that treaties could be drawn up in such a
manner as to distinguish common criminals from patriots, and he
urged Washington to break with British precedent and negotiate
37
treaties along these lines.

30. The Constitution expressly provides for interstate extradition, properly
called rendition. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
31. Clarke lists only five extradition treaties concluded by England between
1174 and 1794. E. CLARKE, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 18-22 (4th

ed. 1903), noted in I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 5. Jefferson reported to Washington
in 1791 that England then had no extradition treaties and English law gave the executive no power to surrender fugitives absent a treaty. 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 17. England's first modern extradition treaty was entered into with the
United States in 1794. I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 12-13; see note 38 infra.
32. J. LATANE, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 85-86 (1927); 4 J.
MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 581 (1906) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE'S DIGEST]; 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 17.

33. Governor Charles Pinckney of South Carolina had sought Washington's advice concerning two accused forgers who had apparently fled to Spanish East
Florida. Washington assigned to Jefferson the task of investigating the scant law
available on the subject. 4 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 32, § 581, at 246-47; 1
MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, §§ 17-21.
34. 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, §§ 17, 22. This rule is still the
law. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1976).
35. 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, §§ 34-36; but see id. §§ 37-39;
see generally 4 MOORE's DIGEST, supra note 32, § 582.
36. Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 45 n.4; Kohler, The Right of Asylum
with ParticularReference to Aliens, 51 AM. L. REv. 381, 405 (1917).
37. Kohler, supra note 36, at 405.
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The Jay Treaty

Under Jefferson's influence the Jay Treaty of 1794 included an
article for the extradition of murderers and forgerers. 3 8 Surrender
was conditioned on the production of evidence sufficient to justify
the arrest and commitment for trial under the laws of the place
where the fugitive was found.3 9 Unfortunately, the Jay Treaty
failed to specify the procedure for deciding this issue.
The extradition article of the Jay Treaty was invoked only
once, in United States v. Robins. 40 Robins was sought by the British for murder and mutiny committed aboard a British frigate. 4 '
The proceeding was conducted almost entirely through diplomatic
channels. President Adams personally presided over the case and
ordered the surrender of Robins. 4 2 Robins then applied for a writ
43
of habeas corpus.
Robins raised fundamental issues of due process and the separation of powers, unfortunately compounded by a sensitive political
issue.4 4 His attorneys argued that the surrender of a citizen to a
38. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty), Nov. 19, 1794,
United States-Great Britain, art. XXVII, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105.

39. Id.
40. 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175); see 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION,
supra note 6, § 78.
41. 27 F. Cas. at 826.
42. Judge Bee of the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina issued a warrant for Robins' arrest on the complaint of the British consul,
but he informed the consul that he could not surrender Robins under the treaty until
Britain's chief diplomatic officer made a requisition to the Federal Executive as required by the terms of the treaty. Letter from Robert Liston, Esq., Minister Plenipotentiary, to Timothy Pickering, Secretary of State (May 23, 1799), reprinted in 38
ANNALS OF CONG. 515 (1800) and in 27 F. Cas. at 841 app. Pickering submitted the
matter to President Adams and then relayed the President's instructions to Judge
Bee to surrender Robins to the British. Letter from Pickering to Judge Bee (June 3,
1799), reprinted in 38 ANNALS OF CONG. at 516 and in 27 F. Cas. at 841-42 app.
43. 27 F. Cas. at 826.
44. While the British claimed Robins was in reality an Irishman named Thomas
Nash, id. at 826, 869 app., there was evidence indicating that Robins was an American citizen who had been impressed into the British naval service, id. at 827. However, the only evidence presented at trial were the prisoner's own affidavits, id.,
which Judge Bee held to be insufficient. Id. at 832. Still, the case caused a public furor that materially contributed to Adams' defeat in the election of 1800. 1 MOORE ON
EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 78, at 90. The reporter thoughtfully added an appendix to the case chronicling this controversy. 27 F. Cas. at 833-70 app. A newspaper
investigated the issue of Robins' citizenship, discovered the records of his claimed
hometown had been destroyed by fire during the Revolution, and obtained statements from persons claiming to know him. Reprinted in 27 F. Cas. at 869-70 app.
The public outrage the case provoked is exemplified in a popular handbill. Reprinted in 27 F. Cas. at 870 app.
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foreign tribunal could only be accomplished through a judicial proceeding in which the accused enjoyed the same constitutional guarantees as in an American criminal trial. 4 5 The judge pointed out
that the Constitution did not change the Anglo-American territorial
rule of jurisdiction, 46 and that this case was in the criminal jurisdiction of Great Britain;4 7 but he otherwise passed over this argument
on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that Robins was
a citizen. 48 He denied the writ and ordered the prisoner's surren49
der to the British.
The case caused long angry debate in Congress and became a
major election issue in 1800.50 Republicans argued that Adams
had unconstitutionally encroached on judicial powers in ordering
Robins' surrender, 51 and that only Congress could constitutionally
prescribe procedure. 52 Representative John Marshall articulated
the Federalist view that, until Congress acted, the" Executive had
the power to prescribe procedure, for otherwise duly ratified treaties could be nullified. 53 The latter view prevailed, although
forty years would pass before the United States entered into another
extradition treaty.
C.

State Action in InternationalExtradition:1822-1872

In 1821 the Governor of Canada, at the request of New York
State Governor DeWitt Clinton, ordered the arrest and surrender
of one Jacob Smith, alias Redington, wanted by New York State on
charges of forgery. 54 As New York criminals could easily slip into
Canada, Clinton wished to encourage the practice by offering a
guarantee of reciprocity. 55 However, the federal government could
not extradite without a treaty, 56 and the United States Constitution
45. 27 F. Cas. at 827-30.
46. Id. at 832.
47. Id.
48. Id. See note 44 supra.
49. This was pursuant to Adams' original order. 27 F. Cas. at 832.
50. 38 ANNALS OF CONG. at 515-18, 526, 532-34, 541-78, 584-621, excerpted at
27 F. Cas. 843-70 app.
51. 38 ANNALS OF CONG. at 548-58. A resolution to censure Adams for unconstitutionally encroaching on the judicial power was defeated. Id. at 558.
52. Id. at 532-33.
53. Id. at 613-14, quoted in Evans, Legal Bases of Extradition in the United
States, 16 N.Y.L.F. 525, 527 (1970).
54. 4 MOORE's DIGEST, supra note 32, § 579, at 240; 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 49, at 59-60.
55. 4 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 32, § 579, at 240.
56. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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does not permit the States to enter into international treaties or
agreements without congressional consent. 5 7 In order to overcome
these obstacles, the New York State Legislature enacted a statute
in 1822, authorizing the governor to surrender to foreign nations
persons charged with crimes in those nations if the crimes with
which they were charged were also punishable either by imprisonment or death under New York State law. 58 An 1827 amendment
provided that no one would be surrendered for the crime of trea-

son.

5 9

Other states quickly followed New York's example, with the
approval and active encouragement of the federal executive. 60 In
some states the governor simply exercised the power without an
enabling statute. 6 1 For twenty years international extradition in the
United States was conducted entirely on a state level, With the Federal Department of State referring foreign ministers to the appro62
priate state government.
In 1839 Governor William Seward temporarily suspended operation of the New York statute because he doubted its
constitutionality. President Van Buren and Secretary of State
Forsyth urged him to execute the statute until it was declared
63
unconstitutional by an appropriate judicial tribunal,
Only a year later, the problem was confronted by the United
States Supreme Court, in Holmes v. Jennison.6 4 At Canada's request, Vermont Governor Jennison had issued a warrant for the arrest and surrender of murder suspect George Holmes. 65 Holmes
applied for a writ of habeas corpus, and the case eventually came
before the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of error. 66 The Court split evenly on the issue of jurisdiction, and the
case was therefore dismissed. 6 7 Chief Justice Taney wrote a
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
58. 1822 N.Y. Laws ch. CXLVIII.
59. 1829 N.Y. Laws Rev. ch. VIII, tit. I, § 8; 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra
note 6, § 49, at 59 n.2.
60. 4 MOORE'S -DIGEST, supra note 32, § 579, at 240-41; see I MOORE ON
EXTRADITION, supra note 6. § 48, at 55-59.
61. 4 MOORE's DIGEST, supra note 32, § 579, at 241-42; 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 48.
62. 4 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 32, § 579, at 240-43; 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 48.
63.

4 MOORE's DIGEST, supra note 32, § 579, at 242; 1 MOORE ON EXTRADI-

TION, supra note 6, §§ 54-55.
64. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
65. Id. at 540-41.
66. Id. at 541-42.

67. Id. at 598.
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strongly worded opinion to the effect that international extradition
was an exclusive power of the federal government, and that state
action in this area was repugnant to the Constitution. 68 Because of
the outcome on the jurisdictional issue, this opinion was technically
dictum. However, three other Justices joined in Chief Justice
Taney's opinion, 69 and two others, though differing on the jurisdictional issue, openly expressed agreement on the constitutional issue. 70 On remand, the Vermont Supreme Court declared the practice unconstitutional on the strength of this dictum and ordered
Holmes released. 71
State action in international extradition did not end abruptly
with Taney's opinion in Holmes v. Jennison,72 but the practice
gradually died out under its influence. 73 After a long period of disuse, the New York statute was declared unconstitutional in 1872 by
the New York State Court of Appeals, 74 thereby eliminating this
75
form of extradition from American law.
D.

The Beginning of the Treaty Making Period

Taney's opinion in Holmes v. Jennison76 served as a warning
that the federal government could no longer neglect its duties in
reliance on state action. 77 Two years later the United States entered into the Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Great Britain,
Article X of which was an extradition agreement. 78 A treaty with

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Ex
39

at 561-79.
at 561 (Story, McLean & Wayne, JJ.).
at 581 (Thompson, J.), 586 (Baldwin, J.).
parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631 (1840).
U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840); see 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6,

§§ 54-65.
73. 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 58; see United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414 (1886).
74. People v. Curtis, 50 N.Y. 321 (1872); see 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra
note 6, § 57.

75. 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 79, at 93.
76. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
77. See notes 64-71 supra and accompanying text. The opinion had a heightened impact because of severe Canadian border troubles between 1837 and 1841 due
to an armed insurrection in that colony; Secretary of State Palmerston proposed an
extradition treaty to the British in 1840. 5 THE AMERICAN SECRETARIES OF STATE
AND THEIR DIPLOMACY 32-33 (S. Bemis ed. 1928).
78. Treaty to Settle Boundaries, Suppress Slave Trade and Surrender Fugitives
(Webster-Ashburton Treaty), Aug. 9, 1842, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 572,
T.S. No. 119.
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France was signed the following year. 79 By 1868 the United States
had entered into thirteen such agreements, and by 1880, twentyfive. 8 0

E.

Forging a Workable Procedure

The Webster-Ashburton Treaty bore the belated fruits of the
congressional debates over United States v. Robins. 8 ' To insure the
accused's right to a hearing, the treaty carved out a role for the judiciary.8 2 Judges and other magistrates were authorized to issue an
arrest warrant upon a complaint made under oath and to conduct a
hearing on the sufficiency of the evidence. 8 3 'If the evidence was
sufficient under the laws of the place where the fugitive was found,
so as to justify arrest and commitment for trial if the offense had
been committed there, the judge or magistrate was to certify this
finding to the "proper Executive authority, that a warrant may is84
sue for the surrender of such fugitive."
Congress elaborated on this basic scheme in the first federal
79. Convention for the Surrender of Criminals, Nov. 9, 1843, United StatesFrance, 8 Stat. 580, T.S. No. 89.
80. Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 42 n.3; see 2 MOORE ON EXTRADITION
app. 1060-162 (texts). International legal historians observed a worldwide upsurge in
interest in extradition treaties during the mid-nineteenth century, which they attributed to a number of factors. Perhaps most important was the advent of steamship and
railway travel, providing fugitives with a quick and inexpensive means of escape.
See I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 11-16; 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, §
3; Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 35-40. In addition, American supporters of
slavery, such as Secretaries of State Abel Upshur and John C. Calhoun, regarded extradition principally as a means for recovering and discouraging fugitive slaves. This
was a central issue in the Webster-Ashburton negotiations, but the abolitionist British consistently refused to extradite escaped slaves. See 5 THE AMERICAN SECRETABLES OF STATE AND THEIR DIPLOMACY 19, 32-36, 111-12, 211-12 (S. Bemis ed.
1928); 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 79.
81. 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175); 38 ANNALS OF CONG. at 515-18,
526, 532-34, 541-78, 584-621; see notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
82. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, United States-Great Britain, art. X,
8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119.
83. [T]he respective judges and other magistrates of the two Governments
shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made under
oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or person so
charged, that he may be brought before such judges or other magistrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and
considered, and if on such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient to
sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate
to certify the same to the proper Executive authority, that a warrant may issue for the surrender of such fugitive.
84.

Id.
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extradition statute, enacted in 1848.85 The procedural framework it
86
established has been substantially retained in the present law. Judicial authority to issue an arrest warrant on a complaint under
oath and to conduct a hearing on the evidence of criminality was
vested in federal and state court judges and commissioners appointed by the federal courts. 8 7 If the evidence was "sufficient . . .
to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or
convention," then the judge or commissioner was to certify these
findings to the Secretary of State. 88 The Secretary of State was
then authorized to arrange and order the surrender of the ac89
cused.
The Act of 1848 established the respective roles of the three
branches of government. 9 0 The Judiciary's role was strictly limited,
for the judge or commissioner acted as a magistrate of the United
92
States. 9 1 The power of final review was vested in the Executive,
while appeals within the courts were limited to petitions for habeas
94
corpus. 93 Congress confined itself to legislating procedure.
85. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302.
86. Compare id., §§ 1, 3, 4, 5 with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184, 3186, 3188 (1976).
87. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302.
88. Id. The same language is used in the analogous modern statute. 18 U.S.C. §
3184 (1976). However, United States treaties have consistently followed the standard
set forth in the Jay Treaty, that sufficient evidence means evidence sufficient to justify the arrest and commitment for trial of the accused under the laws of the place
where the accused was found. E.g., Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922);
Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 989 (1972); Hyde, Notes on the Extradition Treaties of the United States, 8 AM.
J. INT'L L. 487, 487 (1914); see notes 10, 39 supra and accompanying text.
89. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, § 3, 9 Stat. 302.
90. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976 (D.C. Vt. 1979); In re
Locatelli, 468 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 35 C.J.S. Extradition § 34 (1960).
92. In re Heilbronn, 12 N.Y. Legal Observer 65, 70 (1854) (S.D.N.Y. 1854, No.
6,323); Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, § 3, 9 Stat. 302; see 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION,
supra note 6, §§ 361-363; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976).
93. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, reh. denied, 429 U.S. 988 (1976). Congress
vested the same powers in commissioners and state judges as it did in Supreme
Court Justices, and made no provisions for judicial appeals. In re Heilbronn, 12 N.Y.
Legal Observer 65, 74 (1854) (S.D.N.Y. 1854, No. 6,323); 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976); 1
MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 362. The scope of review is limited to
determining whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense was covered by the treaty, and whether there was evidence warranting a finding of reasonable grounds to believe the accused guilty. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d at 482. Declaratory judgment proceedings may also be available but only to determine the
same limited issues as in habeas corpus. Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.
1965).
94. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936); 35 C.J.S.
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One provision of the 1848 act that proved unsatisfactory was
95
the section governing the admission of documentary evidence.
Extradition proceedings depended on the production of foreign
court records as the production of witnesses was impractical. The
procedure set out by Congress, while not elaborate, created con96
flicts with the municipal laws of other nations.
This problem was aggravated by the fact that nineteenth century courts construed extradition treaties and laws strictly against
the government, in the same manner as penal laws. 97 Thus, technical errors could defeat the demanding government's case. 98
Therefore, in 1860 Congress changed the rule to admit documents
or copies thereof if authenticated in such manner "as to entitle
them to be received for similar purposes" in the courts of the demanding government. 99 The certificate of the principal diplomatic
or consular officer of the United States in that country was sufficient proof that it was so authenticated. 00o Efforts in the 1870's to
restrict this liberal standard were unsuccessful, 10 1 and the language
of the 1860 statute has been materially followed since 1882.102
In addition, the Supreme Court in 1902 relaxed the rule of
stricti juris with respect to extradition treaties,'0 3 on the ground
that "techical noncompliance with some formality of criminal procedure should not be allowed to stand in the way of a faithful dis04
charge of our [treaty] obligations."'1
It should be noted how these rules work together. Federal law
for the most part determines admissibility of the demanding government's evidence, 10 5 and incorporates foreign law in the authen-

Extradition § 25, at 455; but see 18 U.S.C. § 3183 (1976) (where foreign country is
under control or occupation by the United States).
95. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, § 2, 9 Stat. 302.
96.

1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 312.

97. See, e.g., In re Farez, 8 F. Cas. 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1869) (No. 4,644).
98. 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 312.
99. Act of Jun. 22, 1860, ch. 184, 12 Stat. 84.
100. Id.
101. Act of Jun. 19, 1876, ch. 133, 19 Stat. 59; 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra
note 6, §§ 313-317.
102. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 378, § 5, 22 Stat. 215; 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1976).
103. Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181 (1902); see 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra
note 6, § 97, at 113.
104. 187 U.S. at 185.
105. United States ex rel. Eatessami v. Marasco, 275 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1976).
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tication of documents. 10 6 State law, on the other hand, provides
the guideline for determining if the weight of the evidence is sufficient. 107
F.

Treaty Interpretationand the Rights of the Accused

The right of the accused to present evidence in his defense
was early held to be somewhat circumscribed by the treaty rule
that the demanding government need only make out a prima facie
case to justify surrender. Otherwise, it was reasoned, the hearing
could be converted into a full scale trial. 1 08 As a general rule, the
accused can testify in his own behalf, introduce evidence establishing want of probable cause and raise defenses provided by the
terms of the treaty, but cannot plead affirmative defenses. 10 9 The
magistrate has considerable discretion in this area, and decisions
concerning the admission of evidence are not reviewable, except
where so extreme as to constitute a denial of a hearing. 1 0
The Ex Post Facto clause does not apply to extradition treaties
because there is no vested right to asylum, but treaties may contain non-retroactivity clauses. 11 The double jeopardy clause does
2
not apply because extradition is not an adjudication of guilt."1
Certain defenses arise from the treaty itself. An offense is not
extraditable if not covered by the treaty. 113 Political offenses are
not extraditable. 11 4 Citizens of the asylum state are exempted by
a common treaty provision. 115 The statute of limitations of either
nation may or may not apply according to treaty provision, but in
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1976).
107. See note 10 supra.
108. Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1888); In re Wadge, 15 F. 864,
866 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
109. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447
(1913); 35 C.J.S. Extradition § 39(d).
110. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922); see 18 U.S.C. § 3189 (1976).
111. Cleugh v. Strakosch, 109 F.2d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 1940); see Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1886).
112. See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414
U.S. 884 (1973); Merino v. United States Marshal, 326 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 997, reh. denied, 379 U.S. 872 (1964); Morse v. United States, 267
U.S. 80, 84-85 (1925).
113. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
414 U.S. 884 (1973); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied sub nom. Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914, reh. denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963).
114. See notes 119-41 infra and accompanying text.

115.

See note 6 supra.
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looking to the statute of limitations the extradition magistrate must
also look to the tolling provisions. 1 16 As a general rule of international law, the accused may not be tried for offenses other than
that for which he was extradited, but this is a contract right of the
17
nations, not a defense the accused can raise.'
In the United States, under a statutory rule traceable to the Jay
Treaty, the demanding government must formally requisition the
Department of State for the accused's surrender within two months
of his commitment following the extradition hearing. Otherwise,
the accused may petition the courts for his release.", 8

II.

THE POLITICAL OFFENDER EXCEPTION

The political offender exception had its roots in the eighteenth
century"19 but first appeared on the Continent in an 1834 treaty' 20
and in the United States in the 1843 treaty with France. 121
Political offenses are classified into two types. Pure political
crimes are acts of espionage, treason and sedition. Relative political
offenses are common crimes, such as murder, assault or robbery,
22
committed under political circumstances or with political motives.'
Relative political offenses have created considerable controversy. First, there was the problem of establishing a suitable legal
test for determining when a common crime had sufficient political
connection to fall within the political offender exception.' 2 3 Second, there was the question, more political and moral than legal,
116. Merino v. United States Marshal, 326 F.2d 5, 12 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 997, reh. denied, 379 U.S. 872 (1964); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 355 F.
Supp. 1155, 1161-62 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1973),
on remand, 377 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), on remand, 401 F. Supp. 1215 (1975),
aff'd, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, reh. denied, 429 U.S. 988
(1976).
117. E.g., United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1973).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3188 (1976); Jay Treaty, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-Great
Britain, art. XXVII, 8 Stat. 116, T.S.No. 105.
119. 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, §§ 205-206.
120. Extradition Treaty between Belgium and France, Nov. 22, 1834, art. 5, VI
Recueil des Traitfs de France 278 (De Clercq ed.), 84 Parry's T.S. 457.
121. Convention for the Surrender of Criminals, Nov. 9, 1843, United StatesFrance, 8 Stat. 580, T.S. No. 89.
122. See generally Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception in Extradition
Law and Practice, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 398 (C.
Bassiouni ed. 1975); Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of ExtraditionLaw, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962).
123. See, e.g., Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties in Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61 (1979).
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to what extent acts of violence in the name of political goals could

be tolerated. 124
As to the first issue, the United States adopted the incidence
test from English law. x2 5 Queen's Bench first set forth this test in
the 1891 case of In re Castioni.1 26 Justice Denman stated that the
offense must be in the furtherance of or with the intention of assisting a political goal,' 2 7 and that it must be committed within the
context of a political uprising or a dispute between two parties over
the control of the government. 128 Judge Morrow of the District
Court of California adopted this test three years later in the case of
In re Ezeta.' 2 9 The new government of Salvador [sic] sought partisans of the deposed government on charges of murder and robbery.' 3 0 Extradition was refused on the ground that the alleged
crimes were committed in furtherance of the former government's
efforts to retain control in the face of revolution.' 3 ' Judge Morrow
also held that determination of this issue was properly within the jurisdiction of the extradition magistrate.' 3 2
Virtually all successful political offender defenses in the United
States have involved civil wars or revolutionary movements,' 3 3 and
the incidence test as set forth in Ezeta is still the law. ' 3 4 It should
be noted that the incidence test defines the magistrate's powers.
The Department of State has the additional, discretionary power to
124. See, e.g., Garcia-Mora, Crimes against Humanity and the Principle of
Nonextradition of PoliticalOffenders, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927 (1964).
125. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
126. [1891] 1 .B.149.
127. Id. at 156.
128. Id.; but see Ex parte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540 (British court expanded
on incidence test to encompass political refugees committing assault and mutiny in
course of escape).
129. 62 F. 972, 997-99 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
130. Id. at 976-79.
131. Id. at 1002-05.
132. Id. at 995-97.
133. See Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972) (political offense must involve uprising or other violent,
political disturbance); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (D.C. Fla. 1959) (makes no
difference that accused and demanding government were on same side); Hyde,
Notes on the Extradition Treaties of the United States, 8 Am. J. Int'l. L. 487, 489-95
(1914); see also Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied
sub nom. Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914 (1963) (solicitation and receipt of bribes or
kickbacks does not constitute political offense within meaning of exception); In re
Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (alleged political motivation of prosecution does not make bank fraud a political offense).
134. See In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 692-93.
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deny extradition on humanitarian grounds if it appears that the ac35
cused will be subject to grave injustice. 1
Much of the international history of the political offender exception has revolved around its qualification on the issue of violence. The French and Belgians introduced the first such qualification in 1856, after two men attempted to assassinate Napoleon III
and fled to Belgium. 3 6 Under the clause d'attentat, the assassination or attempted assassination of a head of state or member of his
family was not included in the political offender exception. 137 This
innovation was readily accepted, as evidenced by the nations that
pledged their cooperation to the United States in the capture of
John H. Surratt, wanted for conspiracy in the assassination of President Lincoln. 138
Anarchists also were systematically excluded from the political
offender exception. For example, in In re Meunier, 1 39 Queen's
Bench held that anarchists did not qualify under the Castioni definition since it required a faction "seeking to impose the govern0
ment of their choice" and anarchists sought no government. 14
The United States had signed treaties excluding assassins and
anarchists from the political offender exception, 14 1 but there apparently have been no United States cases invoking these clauses. Instead, changes in American immigration law have acted to prevent
such offenders from entering the United States.
IV. DISGUISED EXTRADITION:
EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION
Changes in United States immigration policy between the
1870's and the 1920's obviated, to a great extent, the need for extradition. In that period the United States turned from an open
door immigration policy to an extremely restrictive one.' 14 Con135. Peroff v;. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976); In re Sindona, 450
F. Supp. at 694.
136. 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 208.
137. Id. Epps, supra note 123, at 79.
138. 4 MOORE'S DIGEST, supra note 32, § 604, at 353.
139. [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
140. Id. at 419.
141. E.g., Extradition, Sept. 26, 1896, United States-Argentina, art. 2(1), 31 Stat.
1883, T.S. No. 6; Extradition, Jun. 13, 1882, United States-Belgium, arts 11(1), IV, 22
Stat. 972, T.S. No. 30.
142.

See, e.g.,

Bernard ed. 1950).

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION

POLICY-A REAPPRAISAL

1-21
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victed criminals were early targets of these laws. 143 Political offenders were at first expressly exempted, 1 but beginning in 1903
aliens who advocated anarchy or the forcible overthrow of the
United States government were added to the list of excluded
aliens. 14 5 Hence, political offenders whose philosophies were hostile to the United States could no longer find refuge here.
Under the present law even tourists are subject to strict supervision' 46 and extensive grounds for exclusion and deportation. 14 7 Naturally, this has a deterrent effect on foreign fugitives,
and has cut down the need for extradition.
In addition to creating these prophylactic and deterrent effects, deportation procedures can serve as an outright substitute for
extradition, due to the Attorney General's power to choose the deportee's destination from those nations willing to accept him,
1 48
including those wishing to prosecute or punish him for a crime.
For escaped, alien convicts, deportation is practically a complete
substitute.149 For those charged with a crime the overlap is far less
definite. There may not be grounds for deportation if the crime has
not been admitted,' 5 0 or the grounds available may have little or
nothing to do with the alleged offense.
Lastly, immigration law can negate extradition policy. A political offender exempt from extradition may nonetheless be deportable for his beliefs. 151 An accused whose offense is not covered by a
treaty may be deported on any applicable ground. In each case the
143. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477.
144. Id.
145. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(27)-(29), § 12 51(a)(6) (1976); Act of Jun. 28, 1940, ch.
439, tit. II, 54 Stat. 671; Act of Jun. 5, 1920, ch. 251, 41 Stat. 1008; Act of Oct. 16,
1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012; Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213.
146. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (1976).
147.

Id.

148. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1976). The deportee may designate his destination unless the Attorney General concludes it "would be prejudicial to the interests of the
United States." Id. The Attorney General and his delegate, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, enjoy broad discretion in the exercise of this power. Namkung v.
Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955).
149. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9), (10), 1251(a)(1), (4), 1253(a) (1976); See 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 311 (1942); compare International

Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL): Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1976) (escaped Swedish bank robber)
[hereinafter cited as INTERPOL Hearings] with 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra
note 6, §§ 32-36.
150. Exclusion or deportation for the commission of a crime requires either a
conviction or an admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1976).
151. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(28), 1251(a)(1), (6) (1976).
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deportation may conceivably be engineered so that the nation
52
seeking the deportee for prosecution does obtain custody. 1
This potential of deportation law has given rise to what is critically called "disguised extradition.' 153 The classic case was that of
Dr. Robert A. Soblen, wanted by the United States in 1962 on
charges of espionage. Exempt from extradition, he was nonetheless
deported from Israel to the United States and escorted to a plane
upon which a United States marshal was waiting to take custody of
54
him. 1
Congress' power over immigration law is constitutionally one
of its most unlimited powers, 155 and, unlike the executive treaty
power, does not require the concurrence of a foreign government.
The potential for encroachment and policy conflict, insofar as alien
6
fugitives are concerned, is therefore vast. 15
V.

WAR CRIMES

Congress has almost completely wrested the subject of war
crimes from extradition. Although its historical roots are ancient,
the law of war crimes has taken on a special significance since
World War 11157 The United Nations General Assembly in 1946
unanimously passed a resolution recommending that nations take
"all necessary measures" to ensure that war criminals were re8
turned to the jurisdictions where they could be tried. 15
The United States has had only two extradition cases involving
152. 8 U.S.C. § 125 3 (a)(1), (7); see Marcello v. Kennedy, 194 F. Supp. 748
(D.D.C. 1961).
153. I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 79-81; O'Higgins, Disguised extradition: the
Soblen case, 27 MOD. L. REV. 521, 530-31 (1964); Evans, Reflections upon the Political Offense in InternationalPractice, 57 Am.J. INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (1963).
154. Soblen never made it back to the United States. He slashed his wrists and
stomach in the airplane toilet and died in a London hospital; but not until English
courts denied a petition for habeas corpus and ordered him deported to the United
States. I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 79-80.
155. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972); Francis v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.
1976).
156. See United States ex rel. Giletti v. Commissioner of Immigration, 35 F.2d
687 (9th Cir. 1929); Moraitis v. Delany, 46 F. Supp. 425 (D. Md. 1942) (no bar to deportation that it will have de facto effect of extradition); Evans, Acquisition of custody over the internationalfugitive offender-alternatives to extradition: a survey of
United States practice, 40 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 77 (1964).
157. I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 185-87 (1971).
158. G. A. Res. 3, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 9 (1946), reprinted in U.N.Y.B. 66
(1946-47).
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alleged war criminals, 159 and the status of war criminals in American extradition law is in a state of some confusion.
60
The first case, United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic,
involved a Yugoslavian request for the extradition of an ex-official
of the Nazi puppet government of Croatia, wanted on several charges of mass murder. After eight years of litigation involving two
habeas corpus proceedings, 16 1 the extradition hearing was finally
held. 162 Extradition was denied 16 3 on the grounds of insufficient
65
evidence 164 and the political offender exception.1
Curiously, the second petition for habeas corpus had been
granted by the District Court on the ground that the charges were
political offenses; 16 6 and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed on the ground that the United Nations resolution of 1946
did not have the force of law. 16 7 The United States Supreme
Court, in a terse memorandum, vacated the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and remanded the case for an extradition hearing, without explanation or citation to authority. 168 The commissioner interpreted this decision to mean that the political offender issue was
not within the jurisdiction of habeas corpus proceedings. 169 At this
point Yugoslavia's only recourse for review was to an unsympathetic Secretary of State free to base his decisions on political
considerations.
The political offender-war crimes connection did not come up
again until 1973. In In re Ryan, 170 West Germany sought the ex159. In re Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); United States ex rel.
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
160. 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
161. Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952), rev'd sub nom.
Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954), Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F.
Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (second habeas corpus proceeding), aff'd sub nom.
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated, 355 U.S. 393 (1958),
on remand sub nom. United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383
(S.D. Cal. 1959). A summary of the history of the case is given in 170 F. Supp. at
384-86.
162. 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
163. Id. at 393-94.
164. Id. at 388-92, 393.
165. Id. at 392.
166. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
167. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 205 (9th Cir. 1957).
168. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958).
169. 170 F. Supp. at 392. The commissioner did have solid precedent. This
was exactly the holding in Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
170. 360 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973).
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tradition of Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan on charges arising from
her role as a supervisory warden in a concentration camp. Chief
Judge Mishler of the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, acting as extradition magistrate, took judicial notice of the
treaty's political offender clause in a footnote 17 ' but otherwise ignored it in his decision granting extradition.
At the same time, a number of deportation cases concerning
Nazis and alleged Nazi war criminals were pending in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 1 72 The Ryan case eventually led to congressional investigations into charges of INS procrastination in investigating alleged Nazi war criminals for the
purposes of denaturalization and deportation. 17 3 Hearings in 1977
led to the enactment of an amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1182, the exclusion law, expressly authorizing the exclusion and deportation of
any alien who participated in Nazi persecutions, 1 74 and the creation of a Special Litigation Unit to expedite these cases. 175 One
plain purpose of this belated legislation was the return of these alleged war criminals to jurisdictions wishing to prosecute them for
76
these offenses. 1
This action by Congress is probably too late to have much effect, but it demonstrates Congress' ability to usurp an issue and
compensate for the slow process of change in extradition law.
VI.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

International terrorism has been principally a legal and political problem of the 1970's, although precedents date back to the anarchists of the nineteenth century.' 77 For the purposes of recent
4
171. 360 F. Supp. at 273 n. (5).
172. Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (vol.
I), 95th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 81, 87-89 (1977-1978) (statistical breakdown and summary of investigations and deportation and denaturalization proceedings against alleged Nazis) [hereinafter cited as War Criminal Hearings].
173. War Criminal Hearings,supra note 172.
174. Immigration and Nationality Act-Nazi Germany, Pub. L. 95-549, 92 Stat.
2065 (1978) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33) (1978)); see [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4700.
175. [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4700, 4702.
176. E.g., War Criminal Hearings, supra note 172, vol. I at 12 (statement of
Hon. Joshua Eilberg, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law).

177. See generally INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES (C.
Bassiouni ed. 1975); LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (A. Evans & J.

Murphy eds. 1978).
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legal developments, international terrorism can be categorized into
airline hijacking and related acts of extortion and sabotage, kidnapping and other attacks against diplomats and government officials,
and all other acts of terrorism.
The United States was the principal victim of airline hijackings
in the mid-1960's and therefore became an early advocate of mandatory extradition of hijackers. 178 It was only after hijacking became an international epidemic in'
196917 that other nations acted.
In December, 1970, the members "of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) signed the Hague Convention for the
Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. 180 The Hague
Convention required contracting nations to enact legislation imposing "severe penalties"'' on the offense of hijacking, and to either
extradite hijackers or else submit their cases for prosecution in
their own tribunals. ' 8 2 The crime of hijacking in itself provides several nexus for jurisdiction. The Hague Convention provided therefore that the nation of registry, or of the lessee's principal place of
business or residence, or any nation in which the aircraft landed
183
with the hijacker on board all had jurisdiction to try the offense.
178. The United States proposed in 1969 that a protocol be added to the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo
Convention), Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219,
that would require extradition of hijackers, but this was rejected. Report of ICAO Legal Sub-Committee of Unlawful Seizure (1969) cited in Lee, International Suppression of Hijacking, in'INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 248, 250
(C. Bassiouni ed. 1975). A compromise proposal was accepted and incorporated in
the Hague Convention. 63 DEP'T STATE BULL. 449 (1970).
179. See, e.g., Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What is Being Done, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 219, 221 n.3. (C. Bassiouni ed. 1975).
A sense of urgency was created after the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) hijacked six commercial airliners from four countries, destroyed
three, including a Boeing 747, and damaged a fourth, all within two weeks. Id. at
234; TIME, Sept. 21, 1970, at 18-20; N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 1, at 1, col. 8; id. §
4 (Week in Review), at 1, col. 1.
180. Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague
Convention), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, U.N.T.S. __;
see also Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704
U.N.T.S. 219 (basic definitions and jurisdictional concepts).
181. Hague Convention, Dec. 16, 1970, art. II, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No.
7192, __
U.N.T.S. _.
The 1961 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act created
the offense of "aircraft piracy" Pub. L. No. 87-197, 75 Stat. 466 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1472(i) (1976)).
182. Hague Convention, Dec. 16, 1970, art. VII, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No.
7192, __ U.N.T.S. _.
183. Id. art. IV.
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The resulting extradite-or-prosecute formula proved both a politically palatable and effective solution. 18 4 The key to its success lay
in the fact that the asylum nation, if an ICAO signatory, was automatically vested with jurisdiction to try the crime. 185 Nations as a
rule are far more willing to prosecute politically motivated crimes
themselves than to surrender such offenders to other nations for
prosecution. The Hague Convention also avoided possible conflicts
with the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees. 18 6 In 1971, the members of ICAO signed the Montreal Convention extending similar provisions to related acts of air sabo87
tage. 1
In addition, the United States and Cuba, a non-ICAO signatory, signed a five year agreement in 1973 in which each agreed to
88
prosecute air and sea hijackers in lieu of extraditing them. 1
Other forms of terrorism proved far less amenable to legal solution. The Organization of American States signed a convention in
1971 that attempted to use an analogous extradite-or-prosecute formula for the suppression of acts of terrorism against persons "to
whom the state has a duty according to international law to give
special protection."' 18 9 However, the wording of this convention is
extremely vague and ambiguous, and the agreement leaves the formulation of jurisdictional rules entirely to the signatories.
The United Nations has been an exceedingly ineffective forum
for solutions to international terrorism. Arab and African nations
184. As evidenced by the political spectrum represented by the signatories,
e.g., Israel, Jordan, India, Pakistan, Iran, U.S.S.R. et al. 22 U.S.T. at 1669-84, T.I.A.S.
No. 7192,
- U.N.T.S. _
. The incidence of hijacking did drop in ensuing years,
although preventive measures also played a role. Evans, supra note 179, at 221 n.3.
The extradite-or-prosecute formula of the Hague Convention is an ironic echo of
Grotius' position. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
185. Hague Convention, Dec. 16, 1970, art. IV(1)(b), 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S.
No. 7192, __

U.N.T.S. _.

Note that the laws of some nations would require

enabling legislation.
186. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150, modified by Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268.
187. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No.
7570.
188. Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and
Other Offenses, Feb. 15, 1973, United States-Cuba, 24 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7579.
189. Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form
of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413.
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have consistently united against Western proposals for effective deterrents, the Arabs because of the Palestinian issue, the Africans
and other Third World nations on the ground that anti-terrorist
0 The
provisions would be used against legitimate freedom fighters. 19
United Nations General Assembly in 1973 passed a resolution
adopting a convention for the prevention and punishment of acts of
terrorism against "internationally protected persons."' 19 1 This convention was open for signature for one year' 92 and received only
lukewarm support. 193
Western Europe and Israel have been the principal targets of
terrorist attacks, and in 1977, seventeen members of the Council of
Europe signed a convention removing a wide variety of terrorist acts
94
from the protection of the political offender exception. 1
The United States, in recent extradition treaties, 1 95 has excluded either hijacking or attacks against diplomats and government officials from the political offender exception. 196 In addition,
through statute, executive order' 9 7 and international agreement, 9 8
the United States has adopted several provisions allowing for the
use of various economic sanctions against those nations which harbor terrorists.

190. See, e.g., U.N.Y.B. 639-50 (1972); U.N.Y.B. 832-36 (1976).
191. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, G.A. Res.
3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
192. Id. art. 14.
193. 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, U.N.T.S. __. See Arab Terrorism
(editorial), N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1975, at 24, col. 2.
194. Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, [1977] Europ.
T.S. No. 90, reprinted in [1978] Cr. Brit. T.S. No. 93 (Cmd. 7390).
195. E.g., Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada, 27 U.S.T.
983, T.I.A.S. No. 8237; Treaty on Extradition, May 14, 1974, United States-Australia,
27 U.S.T. 957, T.I.A.S. No. 8234; Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 18, 1973, United StatesItaly, 26 U.S.T. 493, T.I.A.S. No. 8052; Treaty on Extradition, Jun. 22, 1972, United
States-Denmark, 25 U.S.T. 1293, T.I.A.S. No. 7864; Treaty on Extradition, May 24,
1973, United States-Paraguay, 25 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7838; Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 21, 1972, United States-Argentina, 23 U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510.
196. E.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1976) (foreign aid); 22 U.S.C. § 286e-11 (1978) (International Monetary Fund); 49 U.S.C. § 1487 (1976) (air travel); 19 U.S.C. §
2462(b)(7) (1976) (trade preferences).
197. Exec. Order No. 12,002, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1978), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. at
1440 (Supp. 1 1977).
198. Joint Statement on International Terrorism by the Participants of the Bonn
Economic Summit Conference, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1308 (July 24,
1978).
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CONCLUSION
Extradition has evolved into an efficient means for dealing
with ordinary criminals, especially since the advent of INTERPOL,
the international criminal police communications network; 19 9 but
the political offender exception has definitely not fulfilled its original ideal of total political neutrality.
Nations on all points of the political spectrum have found
themselves unwilling to tolerate certain political offenders, specifically violent ones.20 0 Hence, the political offender exception has
been riddled with exceptions and its avowed policies undermined
by the use of "disguised extradition" and even kidnapping.2 0 1 A
comprehensive legal definition of what the political offender exception covers is an impossibility, its boundaries subject as they
are to the vagaries of the political tides. 20 2 These facts have led at
least one author to suggest the abolition of the political offender exception as an unworkable legal concept; 203 but such an action
would be undesirable for two reasons. First, it would jeopardize
the ability of nonviolent political offenders, particularly refugees, to
find asylum.2 0 4 Second, it would threaten the very structure of international extradition, which is vitally dependent on the premise
of political neutrality. 20 5 Nations need a guaranty that their police
and courts will not become involved in other nations' internal polit20 6
ical problems.
199. See I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 202-07; INTERPOL Hearings, supra
note 149.
200. See notes 124, 136-41, 157-98 supra and accompanying text.
201. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, Lujan v. Gengler, 414 U.S. 519
(1976). The rule has developed in international law that abduction of the fugitive is
no defense to the subsequent criminal prosecution. Ker. v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886); 1. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 72-76 (note especially the Eichmann case).
202. See Epps, supra note 123; Garcia-Mora, supra note 122.
203. Epps, supra note 123.
204. See note 186 supra and accompanying text. Professor Epps suggests that
conventional asylum, granted as a matter of executive discretion, could substitute for
the political offender exception, Epps, supra note 123, at 87-88, but, query, if the political offender exception is too uncertain as protection, how is unfettered executive
discretion an improvement?
205. See, e.g., International Criminal Police Organization [INTERPOL] Constitution and General Regulations, January, 1968, art. 3, reprinted in INTERPOL Hearings, supra note 149, at 92 (INTERPOL strictly forbidden to intervene in matters of
"political, military, religious or racial character"); I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 205.
206. See, e.g., INTERPOL Hearings, supra note 149, at 57-59, 69-74 (tables
showing international participation in INTERPOL).
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Extradition procedure should be regarded primarily as a
means for apprehending ordinary, non-political criminals. For this
purpose, it is efficient and requires a minimum of federal supervision. 20 7 Where the political philosophies and exigencies of individual nations closely concur, certain very narrow categories of violent
political offenders may be incorporated into extradition by treaty
provision, but extradition's potential in this regard is very limited.
Political offenders require much closer federal supervision because
of the policy considerations. Extradition procedure, which is
streamlined partly due to cost considerations, 20 8 is not adapted to
2
this need . 09
There has, therefore, been a split developing in international
crime control. On one level, conventional extradition procedures
are an effective way of dealing with ordinary criminals. On another
level, other procedures, in the form of deportation and extraterritorial jurisdiction, are developing into the preferred means for dealing with politically sensitive crimes, such as war crimes 2 10 and hijacking, 2 11 because they permit much closer federal regulation.
This evolution should be recognized as a necessary development. Where the federal government determines that certain categories of political offender should be surrendered or otherwise
submitted to prosecution, it is suggested that conventional extradition is not appropriate. If the offender is not a citizen of the asylum
nation, the appropriate federal proceeding can be provided for in
the context of deportation. There has long been criticism of the use
of deportation as a substitute for extradition, on the ground that
the purpose of the two are different, and because the use of deportation as a substitute for extradition has been surreptitious. 2 12 Realistically, there is considerable overlap in policy, and the best way
to prevent undermining of policy in one by policy in the other is
through open acknowledgment and coordination. Where the re207.
208.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186 (1976).
The expense of extradition proceedings has long been a major concern.
See, e.g., 1 MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, §§ 393-394 (individual extradition proceedings in the mid-nineteenth century cost up to $20,000). The general rule
has been that the demanding government pays the costs. 18 U.S.C. § 3195 (1976); 1
MOORE ON EXTRADITION, supra note 6, § 394; I. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 210-11.
209. See notes 196-197 supra.
210. See notes 151-70 supra and accompanying text.
211. See notes 172-82 supra and accompanying text.
212. See generally 1. SHEARER, supra note 5, at 76-91; 6 M. WHITEMAN, DiGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 748-51 (1968).
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questing nation's offender is a citizen of the asylum nation, two solutions suggest themselves. First, citizenship provides an automatic nexus for extraterritorial jurisdiction, 210 with the sometimes
salutary effect of allowing the asylum nation to define the offense
and control the prosecution. Second, specialized extradition proceedings, allowing for much closer federal involvement, could be
provided for such rare occurrences.
This is not to suggest that the original ideal of the political offender exception be abandoned, and that it be converted wholly
into a mere statement of procedural convenience. The ideal of political asylum for the dissident and the refugee should remain, and
the exceptions strictly limited to very narrowly defined categories
of violent political offenders. 2 14 It is suggested that the foregoing
recommendations could advance this ideal and the rule of law, by
eliminating much of the potential for extradition by subterfuge.
Separation of procedure will not answer all the problems concerning political offenders. The definition of what political offenders should be surrendered will remain a volatile, political problem,
but such separation will eliminate procedural complications from
these sensitive political issues.
Where the question is "should this political offender be
granted asylum?" extraordinary proceedings are merited. Changing
issues of national policy, along with the alternative of deportation
to a neutral country, are implicated, and ordinary extradition proceedings are not adapted to deal with these issues.
Marcella Daly Malik
213. See 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 212, at 278.
214. Violence alone could not be justificaiton for surrendering political offenders, since even refugees from dictatorial regimes may be forced to resort to violence
in the course of escape. See, e.g., Ex parte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540 (mutiny and
assault by Polish sailors); 5 THE AMERICAN SECRETARIES OF STATE AND THEIR
FOREIGN POLICY 111 (S. Bemis ed. 1928) (British policy that slaves committing
violent acts in course of escape would not be surrendered).

